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Entrepreneurial graybeards like myself are often asked,“How
do you really get an IPO done, from start to finish?”In my typ-
ically charming way, I grunt and say,“It’s far too complex to
address casually in a few minutes!” While the response is
accurate, it is also unfulfilling to the questioner. Not totally
insensitive to my obligation to share and mentor, I have grap-
pled with how to craft a satisfactory construct to address and
communicate important IPO issues.
An initial trigger point occurred recently when I read the
obituary (Martin 2004) of Jimmy Ling. Many middle-aged
business aficionados will recall Ling as the once-dirt-poor
Okie who took public his small electrical contracting firm in
the 1950s and proceeded to buy first Temco Electronics and
Missiles Company and then Chance Vought, Inc., forming the
Ling-Temco-Vought Corporation. Known as LTV, the growing
conglomerate gobbled up companies in an acquisition fren-
zy. I remember that as a first-year MBA student at a well-
known Eastern business school in the late 1960s, I attended
a guest lecture where Ling explained how he bought Wilson
& Company and immediately spun off or “redeployed the
assets”of Wilson’s meat packing, sporting goods, and pharma-
ceutical operations.Tested critically by tenured professors of
finance, this high school dropout scored debate points at
every turn.The Q&A session was dynamic. His description of
the Wilson deal as “meatballs, golf balls and goofballs” won
over the student body. Over a period of 14 years LTV grew to
become the 14th largest company in the United States. All
from a $738,000 IPO! While many may not recall Jimmy Ling,
most should marvel at the catalytic effect that his miniscule
IPO had on his ensuing business dealings. This Ling case
study undoubtedly planted the seeds for my interest in IPOs.
Continuing to be held hostage to reminiscences of my
youth, I then hit upon a second trigger. I recalled the name
David Reuben. In the arena of self-help literature, his 1972
book—titled remarkably similar to this article’s, substituting
“sex” for “IPO”—sought to represent for sexual education
what Dr. Spock’s books were for baby care. Addressing a
broad and complicated (?) subject area, Reuben employed a
Q&A format to transition from topic to topic. If I can borrow
from his book’s title, then adapting his formatting style can-
not be that much more egregious! Further, certain parallels
between sex and IPOs are evident. Both subjects involve a
degree of self-actualization, hard work, nurturing of relation-
ships, romancing, and performance. If successful,both can be
fun and rewarding. Both endeavors can be undermined by
deadly sins—lust and greed (it is left to the reader to deter-
mine which sin relates to which topic!).
Accordingly, with a series of posed-issues/practical-
answers, and with illustrative real-world case examples, I will
apply my personal observations from more than a dozen IPO
experiences to address the following subtopics:
• The Big Turn On. Why would an entrepreneur/CEO
consider an IPO?
• The Wooing Process.What kind of issues must be consid-
ered and relationships developed to reach an IPO go/no
go decision?
• Planning the Big Event. What’s involved in implement-
ing a successful IPO?
• The Honeymoon Period. How can the short-term
euphoria of an effective IPO be translated into long-
term success?
• Interference from Pesky Third Parties. How does the
newly public company deal with all the regulators?
• Keeping It All Together. What challenges to the public
company present themselves over the years? 
The Big Turn On
Why Does an Entrepreneur Consider an
IPO?
The very mention of “IPO” connotes the big leagues.You can
operate quietly as a “very nice” private company in a New
England suburb, but if your firm is public, then your distant
relatives and old classmates can read about you in the finan-
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Many entrepreneurs want to reach high to theheavens to achieve unlimited success.These hard-working, often underappreciated, venturers often
crave fame and fortune as they strive to create their per-
sonal business legacy. One strategic path many have wan-
dered down is that of the Initial Public Offering (IPO),
whereby shares of the company are sold to the public. The
IPO has many strong attractions. Large amounts of capital
can be brought into the company.The company’s stock can
be used as currency to acquire other companies. Early
investors realize a good ROI. Employees can perceive real
value in their stock options. Customers, banks, vendors,
and other stakeholders pay more respect to the company. Is
this truly the entrepreneur’s nirvana? Or is it a case of “Be
careful of what you wish for because it may really come
true?" Read on.
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cial pages.Your barber, priest, and kids may look at you with
renewed respect. Anticipation of this opportunity for self-
affirmation can be the psychological hook for the entrepre-
neur to pursue an IPO.
The practical hook is cash. If company cash is low, the
need for capital is high.As P. J. O’Rourke (2001) noted,“You
can’t put your Visa bill on your American Express card.” Just
before my first IPO, the company’s trades payables were at
170 days. A vendor in the lobby opened his briefcase to
show off a revolver (not a banking facility, but of the shoot-
ing variety!) and all purchases were on a COD basis. The
bank was thoughtful enough to send out a “work out”guy to
straighten out matters and baby-sit its $1.5 million loan.At 6-
foot 4-inches, 280 pounds, Mr. Work-Out looked like and
growled like a nose tackle for the New England Patriots. He
strongly implied that he liked to hurt people recreationally.
Post-IPO, of course, all these folks—now fully paid off—
became our “best friends.” The IPO provided liquidity and
short-term sanity.
Even if you have adequate cash to sustain operations,
there’s always an appetite for more cash. Virtually every
company has a robust wish list of investment opportunities
and business development initiatives. Any CEO who sips
from the entrepreneurial Kool-Aid cup seeks growth.
Growth, however, is not a sure thing. Florian (2004) reports
on a Bain & Company study that shows that of the 8,000
companies surveyed, only 9 percent had grown revenues
and profits during the past 10 years at a rate of more than
5.5 percent and earned their cost of capital. The abiding
hope is, however, that good ideas, good marketing and sales,
good execution and cash launch a successful growth initia-
tive. In the IPO prospectus, for example, investors examine
the Use of Proceeds section to see how the capital infusion
will be allocated and will contribute to the company’s
growth plan. Investors, brokers, and stock analysts enjoy
imputing the upside leverage that the IPO funds will have
on the company’s performance. Investors analyze the com-
pany’s current status and make judgments on its presumably
rosier future.
Are There Noncash Considerations to
Pursue an IPO?
Indeed. Investor liquidity can be key. In one of our most suc-
cessful IPO deals (current market cap approaching $3 bil-
lion), the company’s newly appointed CEO did not want to
go public. He may have been embarrassed that he had been
fired from his two previous VC-backed deals and that this
ignominy might be publicized in the prospectus. Some of us,
however, viewed being canned by a VC as a badge of honor!
Certainly of more importance was the desire of the three MIT
Ph.D. founders and their early investors to have available to
them an exit position for liquidating their shares.The majori-
ty ruled and the IPO went forward.The company prospered
beyond all expectations. The need for investor liquidity
arguably accelerated the company’s sales and profit growth
despite management’s early resistance.
Another wrinkle to the exit position is the curious phe-
nomenon that the very act of filing for an IPO can attract
M&A bidders and enhance the company’s value. In just one
month last year (Hibbard 2004), the following M&A transac-
tions occurred out of the IPO pipeline:
• AOL bought Advertising.com for $435 million,
• Bob Evans Farms paid $182 million for Mimi’s Café, and
• Allied Capital bought Financial Pacific for $94 million.
How about Noneconomic Considerations?
As Kermit the Frog says, “It isn’t easy being green.”
Sensitivity to issues of society and nature is obviously a wor-
thy objective and represents a hot button for many “enlight-
ened” investors—as long as there are adequate economic
underpinnings. Consider Tom’s of Maine, which seems to
have mastered the art of balancing its idealistic values with
the realities of mass-market retailing (Donahue 2004). From
selling toothpaste in mainstream stores 20 years ago,Tom’s
now peddles more than 90 all-natural products through a
full gamut of distribution channels, including health food
stores and big chains. With $40 million in revenues, Tom’s
pays its employees a 15 percent premium over market and
contributes 10 percent of pretax profit to charity. It targets
the estimated 13 percent of the population that embraces
socially conscious values. If and when Tom’s opts for an
IPO, it should have a reservoir of highly interested
investors.
Banham (2004) reports on the trend that more and more
firms are choosing to operate with a corporate scoreboard
that tracks not only economic, but also environmental and
societal benefits. This is a concept that the people—who
coin such terms—dub “sustainability.” In response, it is esti-
mated that half the investment houses around the world
offer their clients a socially responsible investment option.
The amount of socially responsible capital has grown from
some $100 billion in the early 1980s to $2.2 trillion in 2004.
There’s a Dow Jones Sustainability Index that publicizes the
top 10 percent of socially conscious companies worldwide.
Increasingly, companies strive to be on this Sustainability A-
List. Sustainability motivated companies may well benefit
from an IPO so that they can participate more fully in this
competition to be a good corporate citizen. Good intentions
to project a healthy, green, or do-gooder image, however, can
regrettably be compromised by ill-considered management
behavior. Barker (2004) and Cowan (2005) report that in
December 2004 Herbalife, a direct-marketer of dietary sup-
plements to ease stress and anxiety—using ingredients with
marvelous names like jujube, ashwagandha and passion-
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flower—completed an IPO valuing the company in excess
of $1 billion.While the prospectus acknowledged the death
of founder Mark Hughes in 2000, it failed to mention that it
was a controversial consequence of a four-day binge of alco-
hol and antidepressants. Not the desired “company image,”
negative publicity resulted.Alas, he who lives by the sword
of sustainability …! It is probably no coincidence, therefore,
that the IPO was priced below the low end of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing range.
Is There a Market for IPOs Anymore?
The IPO market is undeniably cyclical. Despite Jimmy Ling’s
impressive IPO-driven success in the 1950s and ‘60s, during
the ‘70s runaway interest rates and other economic factors
mitigated against any serious IPO activity. In contrast, you
would have to be in a deep coma not to be blown away by
the prolific IPO activity from 1983 to 2000.With the new mil-
lennium, the IPO pendulum swung dramatically back to the
“drought”setting.The IPO pipeline dried up.We are now five
years removed from the bursting of the Internet bubble.
Investors are still recovering. Lim (2005) reports that while
broader measures like the Standard & Poor 500 blue chip
index and the Dow Jones industrials have made up their sub-
stantial losses, the NASDAQ is still down 60 percent and
3,000 points from its March 2000 high of 5,048.The problem
is that the NASDAQ index is capitalization weighted; big
stocks (e.g., Microsoft) have not recovered as much as small-
er stocks.This statistical anomaly shrouds the positive trends
of the small caps.
Perhaps a more insightful analysis of the attitudes of
investors toward the small caps (Syre 2004) is to examine the
Russell 2000 small stock index, which has had a total return
of 65 percent since 2000, compared to the large company
Russell 1000 index, which has risen only 9 percent. One
might argue that this performance sets a favorable climate for
IPOs. How has the IPO market responded? Here are a few
facts of note (Rivlin 2005):
• In 2004 there were 242 IPOs, nearly equaling the com-
bined total of the previous three years.
• A blended return on investments in all 2004 IPOs would
be 21 percent.
• Four out of 10 2004 IPO companies were losing money,
compared to 74 percent for IPOs in 1999–2000.
• Forty percent of the 2004 IPO companies had annual
sales under $50 million.
There will, of course, be IPO market opportunities in
2005.There is a glimmer of hope for the entrepreneur-CEO.
With influences like ego and cash at play, an IPO can be
alluring. As an overworked, underpaid entrepreneur, if you
want to be seduced, you can always find one or more good
reasons to be turned on by the prospects of pursuing an
IPO.
The Wooing Process
What Factors Should a Private Company
Consider before Taking the Big Step into
an IPO?
Going public is one of the most important events in a compa-
ny’s life. As a method of raising capital, the IPO has served
American business remarkably well. Most large U.S. compa-
nies and many smaller, vigorous companies with strong
growth momentum have chosen to sell shares to the public.
Companies can raise considerable capital at attractive valua-
tions.
The IPO decision requires careful consideration.IPO capital
raised can be the valuable lubricant for the organizational
engine:working capital,plant and equipment,marketing,R&D,
debt retirement, and M&A transactions. Going public, howev-
er, goes far beyond just raising capital. Even when it is the best
option, it is always a mixed blessing. For a start, the company
will give up the privacy and autonomy it has previously
enjoyed. Management’s freedom of action will be curtailed as
outside investors hold the company accountable for perform-
ance. The company will be required to disclose important
information to all the world, including its competitors.
The seductive allure of pursuing an IPO wanes quickly
when the company’s CEO and CFO perform some rudimen-
tary due diligence.The journey down the IPO trail, they learn,
can be a brutally difficult process often exceeding their
worst fears. It is not a trip for the lazy, guilty, or incompetent.
Even the most seasoned entrepreneur may be stunned by the
vicissitudes of the financial marketplace. Due diligence may
reveal that many public offerings fall below expectations or
even fail for a variety of reasons:
• The offering can run into bad stock market dynamics. I
once received a “firm commitment” IPO letter from an
underwriter on the same day that the Dow lost about 7
percent of its value in three hours—the “firm”-ness of
the deal was delayed by 10 months.
• The auditors can restructure the company’s accounting
conventions and reclassify costs to cause a huge nega-
tive earnings hiccup that can torpedo the IPO. During
my first IPO, I learned this difficult lesson.Thankfully, I
was able to negotiate enough offsetting items to keep
the offering alive.
• Other companies of which I was aware had profit down-
turns during the IPO pursuit, and irretrievably lost their
IPOs.
• Another company I knew had the misfortune to endure
a six-month delay because the underwriter wanted the
company to reconstitute and upgrade its Board of
Directors.
The company must clearly weigh all the pluses and minus-
es to the IPO decision.
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What Are the Advantages of an IPO to a
Small Company?
The factors influencing a “go” IPO decision are straightfor-
ward: money, currency, motivation, prestige, and liquidity.
• Improved Financial Condition.The sale of shares to the
public brings in capital that does not have to be repaid,
thereby immediately improving the company’s financial
condition.This improvement may allow the company to
borrow money at more favorable terms. Moreover, if the
initial stock offering is successful and a strong aftermar-
ket develops, the company may be able to raise more
capital by selling additional shares - at presumably a
higher valuation.
• Using Stock for Acquisitions. Once the company is pub-
licly traded, it can issue additional shares.This capacity
to mint new currency, despite its potentially dilutive
effect, can serve to fuel an active M&A program. Many
newly public companies choose to acquire other firms
to accelerate their growth plans.
• Using Stock as an Employee Incentive. Companies fre-
quently offer stock incentives, such as stock options,
stock appreciation rights,or stock bonuses to attract and
retain key personnel.While the audit and tax treatments
of such incentives are becoming increasingly severe for
the company, these arrangements nevertheless tend to
instill in employees a healthy sense of ownership and
the hope for capital appreciation. .
• Enhancing Company Prestige. One of the intangible,
but widely recognized,potential benefits of going public
is that the company becomes more visible and attains
increased prestige. Through press releases and other
public disclosures, and through daily (and real-time) list-
ings in the paper and over the Internet, the company
becomes better known to the business and financial
communities, to investors, to the media, and even to the
general public.While both good and bad news must be
disseminated to enable investors to make well-informed
decisions, the public company that is well run and com-
piles a record of good performance can gain a first-class
reputation. As the company’s name and products and
services become better known, not only do investors
take notice, but so do customers and suppliers who
often prefer to do business with well-known companies.
• Investor Liquidity. Early investors are concerned about
their exit strategy.An IPO helps to resolve this issue.
What Are the Disadvantages of an IPO
to a Small Company?
For each and every one of the successful IPOs in which I’ve
been involved, there have been certain well-intentioned cyn-
ics who launched warning flares on how truly dumb an idea
our IPO pursuit was.Their objections, which our companies
weren’t bright enough to heed, were nevertheless worth
consideration. In the end, we succeeded where others may
have failed. Indeed, for certain ill-prepared companies, for
some inexperienced management teams, or for some just
plain bad deals—such critique may have merit, and be worth
heeding. For example:
• Loss of Privacy. Of all the transformations a company
undergoes when it becomes public, probably the most
troublesome is the loss of privacy. When the company
shifts from private to public status, it is required to reveal
highly sensitive information, such as compensation to
key executives, special incentives for management, and
many of the plans, strategies, and capital investments that
underpin the company’s future direction. Such disclo-
sures are required for the IPO Registration Statement and
subsequently on a continuing basis with the quarterly
(10Q) and annual (10K) reports.
• Limiting Management’s Freedom to Act.While the man-
agement of a privately held company is generally free to
act by itself, the management of a public company must
obtain the approval of the board of directors on certain
major matters. On special issues, the company must
even seek the consent of the shareholders. Clearly
“going public” translates into diminished management
flexibility. Further, shareholders are mostly distant and
unsympathetic. These public owners of the company
judge management’s performance in terms of earnings,
share price, and dividends. Public shareholders may
exert pressure for the company to increase earnings and
pay dividends each quarter. Such pressure may cause
management to emphasize short-term considerations
over long-term goals.
• The High Cost of Going Public. The costs of an IPO are
substantial and can be categorized into three classes:
• Managed Costs
i. Audit expenses are a function of how well the
company’s financial systems and accounting
department hold up to third-party scrutiny.With
the audit industry shake out and consolidation
and with increased regulatory oversight arising
from Sarbanes-Oxley (Sarbox), auditing firms are
charging increasingly higher fees, and companies
are tolerating the scrutiny a lot less.Twenty-eight-
year-old senior managers—not partners—of a
large auditing firm charge as much as $275 per
hour! The number of hours to reconstruct unau-
dited reporting periods and/or to restructure the
financials to GAAP standards can be exorbitant.
Depending on how adequate the company’s
financial records are, the IPO auditing bill can be
$125,000 to $350,000.
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ii. Legal expenses are a function of how smoothly
the IPO process proceeds and how complex the
company’s contracts, due diligence list, and intel-
lectual property issues are. Further, the quality
and accuracy of company input to the writing of
the IPO Registration Statement can help or hin-
der the process. I had one CEO fight the attor-
neys every step of the way.The law partner told
me that this stubborn behavior doubled the legal
tab! With 25-year-old law school grads being
hired by Boston law firms at $130,000 (plus a
$25,000 bonus), the legal bill can escalate. Plan
on at least $200,000 to $450,000 for the IPO.
iii. Printing costs are a function of the number of
copies of the prospectus (the finalized
Registration Statement) distributed to sub-
scribers of the offering.Years ago, dinosaurs like
me worried about setup costs (print in molten
lead) and expensive last-minute changes. The
printing costs are better contained these days
with electronic files, but the prospectus tab still
can be $50,000.
iv. Road Show expenses are determined by how
many venues the company presents itself to
investor audiences, in how many cities, and with
how many company executives supporting the
presentations. A highly polished dog-and-pony
show is not just nice to have, but an absolute
requirement to play IPO Pursuit. Budget $20,000
to $40,000.
v. Director and Officer (D&O) Insurance is protec-
tion for the BOD and company management
regarding potential litigation arising from public
representations. The cost of D&O insurance
varies, but can range from $100,000 to $750,000
per year.
• Semi-variable and Variable Costs 
i. Blue Sky fees.These fees are dependent on which
states the underwriters want to sell shares in;
state-by-state registration (“Blue Sky”) fees are
incurred. Such fees have increased, on average,
about 3 percent over the last five years. Budget
$10,000 to $15,000.
ii. SEC filing fees. The SEC needs to pay for its in-
house legal and accounting staffs which review
the Registration Statement. These fees have
stayed relatively stable over the last five years.
Budget $10,000 to $15,000.
iii. Underwriter fees. In a combination of cash and
warrants, budget 6 to 9 percent of the gross pro-
ceeds of the IPO.
• Disruption Costs. On a case-by-case basis, the
CEO/CFO can impute the lost time associated
with key personnel being sidetracked from their
normal duties to support the IPO effort.This is an
opportunity cost, not an accounting cost, but cer-
tainly can have a serious economic impact on the
company. Pick a number.
• Loss of Control. In past articles of the New England
Journal of Entrepreneurship (Levangie 2003), I have
discussed in detail the emotionally laden issue of man-
agement’s perception of loss of control and dilution of
ownership.Owners of private,closely held companies
always have a problem with “giving away a piece of
their baby.” My typical big-picture response to such
equity paranoia, read from the Book of Business
Clichés, is that a smaller slice of a much bigger pie is
generally worth a lot more than a larger slice of a
smaller pie—sort of a pizza philosophy! The MBA
approach, of course, is to employ a really neat chart.
Table 1 depicts in gory detail a simple equity model
that portrays a “generic” company from start-up
through the IPO. In this illustration, the entrepreneur-
CEO’s personal equity position starts at 65 percent of
the company,with an imputed value of $2.275 million.
Growing the company through a series of private cap-
ital raise-ups, the CEO can retain a pre-IPO ownership
of 34.7 percent, with an imputed value of $6.035 mil-
lion. Post-IPO, the CEO still owns 27.1 percent
(arguably “effective” control” of the company) with an
imputed value of $16.747 million.
What about Structural Ways to Assure
Control after the IPO?
For incorrigible control freaks, there is available the concept
of “dual-listed” companies.These are entities in which regular
stockholders own shares that typically entitle them to divi-
dends and other benefits,but with limited voting rights.At the
same time, there is generally a small number of shareholders
who control the company with supervoting stock.These real-
ly “super”shares may have x-to-one voting power,where x can
be 10 or more. I was introduced to this concept three decades
ago when An Wang (and later his son Fred) controlled Wang
Corporation with a dual-listing structure. Serwer (2004)
reports that from the 1920s until 1986, the NYSE did not
allow dual-listers to be on the Big Board; these entrepreneur-
ial or family-owned firms turned to Amex and NASDAQ.
According to the IRRC,a corporate governance research firm,
more than 11 percent of the 2,000 companies it presently
tracks are dual-listed. Examples: newspaper firms like Dow
Jones, the NY Times and the Washington Post;media firms like
Comcast,Adelphia and Viacom; and industrial firms like Ford,
Coors and Tyson Foods. Google, in its clumsy Dutch-auction
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IPO that Levy (2004) describes as “inspired by Inspector
Clouseau” (improper share distribution to employees, confus-
ing explanations of the auction procedure, initial overpricing
that scared investors away, and the ill-advised Playboy inter-
view that probably violated the SEC’s pre-IPO “quiet period”)
opted for dual-listing. It is not a huge surprise, therefore, that
proxy advisor Institutional Shareholder Services recently
rated Google’s corporate governance worse than any other
firm in the S&P 500. A significant governance issue is:“How
can a Board of Directors tell management how to act when
management’s super votes can kick out the BOD?”
Who Makes the Company’s “Go” Decision
on the IPO?
The decision authority to pursue an IPO ultimately resides
with the Board of Directors of the company, on behalf of the
company’s shareholders. If the CEO-entrepreneur is still the
majority shareholder, the IPO decision is, of course, more
concentrated in one person. In any case, the rewards v. the
costs, the positives v. the negatives and the limelight v.
anonymity must all be weighed. Is the business model right?
Is there an organizational will to “go to the next level” Is the
decision-making balanced? The entrepreneur should not
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[Co. Valuations in $000s]
Employee
Options VC or Pvt.
Employee
Options IPO
Initial Angel #1 Plan #1 Placement # 1 Plan #2 @ $ Valuation
Pre-Money Value $3,500 $6,500 $8,000 $12,000 $15,500 $45,000
Additional Investment n/a $1,500 n/a $3,500 n/a $15,000
Pre-Money Stock Price $3.50 $6.50 $6.50 $9.75 $9.75 $28.31
New Investment Stock Price n/a $6.50 n/a $9.75 n/a $28.31
Post-Money Blended Stock Price $3.50 $6.50 $6.50 $9.75 $9.75 $28.31
Pre-Money No. of Shares [ I/O ] 1,000,000  1,000,000  1,230,769  1,230,769  1,589,744  1,589,744  
Additional No. of Shares [ I/O ] 0 230,769 0 358,974 0 529,915
Post-Money No. of Shares [ I/O ] 1,000,000  1,230,769  1,230,769  1,589,744  1,589,744  2,119,658  
Post-Money Value $3,500 $8,000 $8,000 $15,500 $15,500 $60,000
Issue of Employee Stock Options
[ as % of I/O ] 10% 10%
123,077  158,974  
Exercise Price [ @ 80%
of Pre-money Stock price ] $5.20 $7.80
Fully Diluted No. of Shares 1,230,769  1,353,846  1,712,821  1,871,795  2,401,709  
Fully Diluted Post-Money Value $8,000 $8,640 $16,140 $17,380 $61,880
Fully Diluted Blended Stock Price $6.50 $6.38 $9.42 $9.29 $25.76
Fully Diluted Holdings:    %s,  No. of Shares, & Values
CEO F. D. % 65.0% 52.8% 48.0% 37.9% 34.7% 27.1%
F. D. # Holding 650,000 650,000 650,000 650,000 650,000 650,000
F. D. $ Holding $2,275 $4,225 $4,148 $6,125 $6,035 $16,747
SVP F. D. % 35.0% 28.4% 25.9% 20.4% 18.7% 14.6%
F. D. # Holding 350,000 350,000 350,000 350,000 350,000 350,000
F. D. $ Holding $1,225 $2,275 $2,234 $3,298 $3,250 $9,018
Angel #1 F. D. % 0.0% 18.8% 17.0% 13.5% 12.3% 9.6%
F. D. # Holding 0 230,769 230,769 230,769 230,769 230,769
F. D. $ Holding $0 $1,500 $1,473 $2,175 $2,143 $5,946
VC / PP #1 F. D. % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 21.0% 19.2% 14.9%
F. D. # Holding 0 0 0 358,974 358,974 358,974
F. D. $ Holding $0 $0 $0 $3,383 $3,333 $9,249
Total Employees F. D. % 0.0% 0.0% 9.1% 7.2% 15.1% 11.7%
F. D. # Holding 0 0 123,077 123,077 282,051  282,051  
F. D. $ Holding $0 $0 $785 $1,160 $2,619 $7,267
Public Investors F. D. % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 22.1%
F. D. # Holding 0 0 0 0 0 529,915
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bravely jump at the IPO opportunity like Evel Knievel.
Correspondingly, management cannot proceed with cold
feet. Much akin to a couple contemplating matrimony, the
company must be willing to embrace with open eyes a sea
change of life-altering new relationships and responsibilities.
The practical aspect of the IPO Pursuit is the significant
“ante-up” money needed to play the game. A stake on the
order of $1 to 2 million is required to pay IPO front-end
expenses, including the accountants and lawyers. In several
IPOs, I’ve had occasion to arrange private placements of
bridge loans that provide investors with above-market interest
rates and warrants. The bridge loan can be exciting. In one
IPO, five of us on my residential street provided the entire
bridge loan, using our houses as collateral. I shudder to think
what would have been the local real estate fallout if the IPO
had not been successful!
As one experienced practitioner, I underscore the enormi-
ty of the IPO decision. In many cases, the company is betting
its entire business.Yet even with failure, some good (merger
or consolidation opportunities) might arise.The spirit of the
IPO go-forward decision, however, has to be to get the offer-
ing done. As Kepner (2004) cites from “Gnomologia” (circa
1732):“All things are difficult before they are easy.”
Assuming the BOD Agrees to Pursue an
IPO, What Relationships Must be
Developed?
The “Wooing Process” requires a coupling of parties.The IPO
candidate must find an investment bank that underwrites IPOs
and will listen to the company’s story. Firms are available to
hold the company’s hand in IPO matters. For example,Ardour
Capital Investments, a young NYC investment firm (on whose
board I serve), gives clients advice on such issues. Ardour
(Dukes 2005) advises that investment bankers, long deprived
of lucrative IPO fees, are preparing for a significant surge in
IPO underwriting revenue in 2005. The investor bankers’
enthusiasm for IPOs is reinforced by venture capitalists who
have portfolios of companies—some of which may be IPO
candidates—and who are eager to see the IPO market open up
to liquidate some of their investments.The robustness of the
IPO market recovery can only be helped by bringing high-qual-
ity, seasoned companies to market. It is envisioned that most
IPO candidates will be profitable with proven business mod-
els. On the heels of this anticipated IPO resurgence, there also
may be some IPO candidates that are unprofitable, but which
are market-leading companies or those possessing ground-
breaking technologies and/or environmentally safe replace-
ments for existing technologies.Companies may be addressing
certain sectors which are of interest to particular investment
banks— alternate energy,biotech, Internet,etc.Common inter-
ests can often reinforce a budding relationship between the
underwriter and the company.
Asher (2004) points out that the financial services industry
is in a sustained state of flux. First, there are the megafirms
resulting from industry consolidation.These global firms have
downsized their investment banking operations and have not
yet determined whether it makes economic sense to service
the middle market of emerging growth companies.And if these
megabanks do reach out to smaller IPO candidate companies,
how do they generate enough fees to cover their overhead?
The large investment banks dominate IPO activity.Gullapalli
(2005) reports on some Thomson Financial statistics chroni-
cling 2004 IPO Underwritings:
In New England, long-time investment banking supporters
of the technology sector—Alex. Brown, Donaldson Lufkin
Jenrette, Robertson Stephens, and Hambrecht & Quist—have
been gobbled up by the global megafirms.Accordingly, entre-
preneurs’ access to investment bankers (IBs) to discuss IPOs
has become that much more restricted.Other IBs include Bear
Stearns, SG Cowen, and US Bancorp Piper Jaffray.
Most of the low-end IBs, which typically were production
houses for cookie-cutter, smaller value IPOs in the 1988–1999
period,have involuntarily left the industry.A substantial void in
the market now exists for IPO offerings of less than $35 to $50
million.
To establish a relationship with an underwriter, an IPO can-
didate generally needs a referral and often some friendly hand-
holding. I know of dozens of companies that went solo,knock-
ing on investor banking doors, up and down the Street. Much
akin to a Fuller Brush salesman, these enthusiastic cold-callers
all got the “bum’s rush!” Referrals to IBs are critical. Referrals
can come from venture capitalists,obviously if the company is
in the portfolio or, in some cases, if the company is a friend of
the VC firm.Another source of help is the referral that comes
by way of regional financial service firms.
The top eight VCs in New England, ranked by investment
dollars for the period July1, 2003 to June 30, 2004, as reported
by McBride-Bey (2004), are:
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Manager Amount ($B) 2004 # of Issues
Market Share
Morgan Stanley 7.3 16.3% 21
Goldman Sachs 7.1 15.8 29
Merrill Lynch 4.5 10.1 31
JP Morgan 4.0 8.8 25
Citigroup 3.6 8.1 19
Credit Suisse 
First Boston 3.6 8.0 23
Friedman Billings 
Ramsay 3.1 7.0 19
Lehman Brothers 2.4 5.3 20
UBS 2.3 5.1 20
Banc of America 1.5 3.3 16
Top Ten Totals 39.4 87.8% 223
Industry Totals 44.8 100.0% 233
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1. Polaris Venture Partners
2. Highland Capital Partners
3. Healthcare Ventures LLC
4.Atlas Venture
5. Kodiak Venture Partners
6. Charles River Ventures
7. Battery Ventures
8. Prism Venture Partners
Hand-holding advisors catering to New England companies
include:
• Adams Harkness & Hill
• Ardour Capital Investments
• Capstone Partners LLC
• Covington Associates
• Downer & Co.
• O’Conor Wright & Wyman 
• Shields & Co.
Referrals for underwriters can also come from lawyers and
accountants. More on this below.
Planning the Big Event
Now that There’s BOD Approval for an
IPO and an Acknowledged Need to
Develop Investor Banking Relationships,
How Can the Deal be Closed?
Prayer and spiritual supplication wouldn’t be a bad start.The
company will need all the help it can muster. The best
approach is for senior executives to take adequate time and
thought to organize for the Big Event. I firmly believe that
every hour of serious planning invested on the front end will
help avoid a full day of delay on the back end. Once the pace
of the IPO quest accelerates, the company can become a fre-
netic madhouse.The CEO and CFO must assure that there are
systems in place to: absorb the emotion and confusion of a
panic-stricken staff; respond to requests for “unavailable” infor-
mation; and support an almost endless series of forms, con-
tracts, disclosures, and financial analyses.
In short, the IPO game plan follows this outline:
• Assemble the IPO team, including the legal and audit
firms.
• Address countless housekeeping items.
• Translate the company’s business plan into an IPO “selling
document” or brochure on why the company is “so darn
good.”
• Through the recommendations of advisors and other
referrals, develop a contact plan for prospective under-
writers.
• Interview underwriters and stimulate IPO interest in the
company.
• Select an underwriter (or in many cases, be lucky enough
to be selected by an underwriter).
• Execute the writing of the Registration Statement (prelim-
inary prospectus).
• Perform well on the “Road Show.”
• Negotiate the pricing of the IPO deal.
What IPO Advisor Is Most Important?
The company’s securities attorney is a central player.Teamed
with the CEO and CFO, the company’s outside counsel helps
the company walk the thin line between putting forward the
best face of the company throughout the prospectus, while
protecting the company’s backside against potential litigation.
I would seek an attorney with most, if not all, of these traits:
• Is intelligent and a quick study;
• Knows the company’s business and people;
• Has extensive IPO and SEC-related experience;
• Is a good, simple and fast writer;
• Listens more than lectures;
• Has a “can-do”attitude;
• Worries problems to death, but in a positive, constructive
way;
• Has a sufficiently pleasant personality to establish good
chemistry with the underwriter and underwriter’s counsel;
• Is essentially unflappable in the face of the inevitable
clashes of Type A+ egos, and deflects these battles with le
mot juste and some self-effacing humor; and
• Is more concerned about IPO success than billable hours.
Where do outstanding candidate lawyers reside?
Unfortunately, this is no longer a straightforward issue. The
legal landscape of firms servicing the entrepreneurial/corpo-
rate community has undergone substantial changes in recent
years, no doubt due to the bursting of the Internet (technolo-
gy) bubble in 2000. In the Boston area, for example, the follow-
ing old-time firms were impacted (Blanton 2005):
• Warner & Stackpole (est.1874) merged into Kirkpatrick &
Lockhart.
• Peabody & Brown (est. 1854) merged into Nixon
Peabody;
• Bingham Dana (1890) merged into Bingham McCutchen;
• Hutchins, Wheeler & Dittmar (est. 1844) merged into
Nixon Peabody;
• Hill & Barlow (est. 1895) closed;
• Hale and Dorr (est. 1918) merged into Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr; and in 2005
• Testa Hurwitz & Thibeault (est. 1973) closed.
This turbulent law firm climate has created a series of rela-
tionship upheavals involving large numbers of law partners
and associates changing firms. This unprecedented turnover
complicates the company’s decision in selecting outside
counsel. In many cases, the company already has an excellent
law firm that, with a little jump-starting, can support the IPO
effort.The more difficult scenario is when inadequacies in the
company’s current law firm dictate that a switch to a more
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full-service, more SEC-oriented law firm is required.
Thankfully, there are many dozens of firms in New England
that can do competent IPO work. They range from the
megafirms, such as Ropes & Gray and Mintz Levin, Cohn,
Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, to boutiques, like Morse, Barnes-
Brown & Pendleton (“The Business Law Firm on Route 128”).
The trick is to find the right person inside the law firm. In
many cases, this individual may also be an excellent source of
investment banking referrals.
What about the Auditing Firm?
The key to the accounting challenge is to find an audit firm
which is well versed in the particular nuances of the compa-
ny’s industry, and experienced in IPOs and SEC filings. If the
company’s books are still being kept by the entrepreneur’s
brother-in-law, then there’s a big problem.There may still be a
dicey problem if the company’s competent audit firm is wary
of a new publicly traded client. In the post-Enron era with the
confining regulations of Sarbanes-Oxley, many audit firms are
weighing very conservatively their own partnership’s risk-
reward trade-offs. Rather than be client-oriented, many audit
firms have adopted a standoffish stance.As a result,many small-
er—and presumably riskier—audit clients are being driven
away by escalating fees and inhibiting audit policies, including
“qualified going concern” opinions regarding the projected
ability of marginally profitable, fast-growing companies to con-
tinue operations over a 12-month period.
Audit industry consolidation has exacerbated the account-
ing dimension of the IPO challenge.What used to be the “Big
Eight” is now the “Big Four:”
• PricewaterhouseCoopers
• Ernst & Young
• Deloitte & Touche
• KPMG
Arthur Young,Touche Ross,and Coopers Lybrand have been
subsumed into competitors.Arthur Andersen has closed down.
Accordingly, the movement of CPAs to other firms has caused
major discontinuities in what was previously a stable industry.
Audit partners with whom I teamed in past IPOs are now in
new firms with different client selection criteria.Some frustrat-
ed CPA acquaintances are simply not in the business any more.
Nevertheless, there are several good second-tier national and




• Wolf & Co.
• Brown & Brown
With the right audit firm and the right audit partner, the var-
ious accounting tasks associated with the IPO can be almost
tolerable. Don’t expect much in the way of investment bank-
ing referrals from the CPAs these days since their worries of
partnership liability outweigh any inclination to help clients
with capital raise-ups.
What Corporate Housekeeping Issues
Need to be Addressed?
After the company makes the IPO go-forward decision and
brings in the appropriate legal and audit advisors, the CEO and
CFO should consider the steps needed to facilitate a crisis-free
transition from private company to public company. Certain
corporate housekeeping items may need to be cleaned up,and
it must be determined whether the necessary information is
available to resolve outstanding issues.Among possible house-
keeping items are:
• Should the company’s capital structure be revised? The
company may want to simplify it by exchanging common
shares for preferred stock or special classes of common
stock.
• Does the company need to authorize additional shares of
stock to complete the IPO and for future stock offerings
and anticipated M&A activity?
• Should the stock be split in anticipation of a more mar-
ketable share price?
• Should affiliated companies and other related entities be
consolidated to create a more attractive IPO package for
public investors?
• Should the company consider a name change? Certainly if
the current name is akin to “Acme Technologies,”then per-
haps a rebranding is in order. Five years ago companies
felt anything was OK—say, StupidInvestment.com! My
branding bias is toward names that suggest what the com-
pany actually does. Few know that the company formerly
known as Arthur Andersen Consulting is Accenture.
Company names such as Blockbuster, Palm, and Subway
are much more memorable.
• Does the management team need to be pruned and/or
upgraded? Can the CEO stand up to a national audience
of business critics? Is the CFO just a good accounting
manager or can he or she competently “market” the
company to the financial community? Does the sales
and marketing person really know the customers and
distribution channels? How deep is the management
bench?
• Does the Board of Directors membership need to be
upgraded? In this time of increased regulatory oversight,
such a task is nontrivial.Many qualified candidates decide
not to join public BODs. While I was on five public
boards—simultaneously—10 years ago, I am now on just
one public board today.With the need for increased cor-
porate governance, the workload for a director has esca-
lated, and the liability has also risen.
• Does the BOD need to amend the company’s articles of
incorporation or bylaws? The company may need to clean
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up certain voting provisions or set up BOD committees,
such as an audit committee.
• Here’s one item that unbelievably comes up far too often
to even be amusing: Does the company have a complete
shareholder record? One really doesn’t want a scene out
of The Producers in which 300 percent of the company’s
equity has been committed!
• What is the state of BOD and management transactions?
Are such dealings appropriate for a public company? Are
there any overpaid, flagrantly underqualified relatives on
the payroll? Does the company pay for the CEO’s cottage
at the shore? A sensitive section of the Registration
Statement is “Related Party Transactions.”
• Have all appropriate material and management contracts
been drafted and signed? Is there a stock option plan for
employees?
• Does a physical inventory have to be taken? In one of my
IPOs, there was—simultaneous with the IPO—a planned
acquisition of an old-line company whose extensive
product lines had zillions of little parts.The target com-
pany had never taken a physical inventory count. Before
proceeding with the IPO, we had to commission a
“forensic” audit firm to recreate and impute historical
inventory levels to develop auditable financial state-
ments.
Which of These Housekeeping Items Is
Most Important?
While the failure to accomplish everything on the housekeep-
ing list is a sure ticket to Blown-IPO-ville, I consider the BOD
recruitment issue the most difficult.As part of Sarbanes-Oxley’s
new corporate governance standards, the national securities
exchanges have mandated that:
• Audit committees be composed entirely of independent
directors.
• Companies must disclose whether their audit committee
contains a “financial expert.”
• The audit committee have extensive authority to select
and oversee the company’s independent audit firm.
Issues of BOD independence and financial “literacy” under
Sarbox have come into prominence. The challenge for the
company’s shareholders, for the current BOD, and for manage-
ment is to identify and recruit qualified BOD candidates.What
due diligence is required in this challenge? Pose questions like
the following:
• What’s the skill set and business experience of the candi-
date? Is this person complementary to the existing board?
• Does the candidate adhere to the highest ethical stan-
dard?
• What about the Sarbox concern for financial literacy?
• How difficult will it be for the candidate to attend sched-
uled meetings and carry the workload?
• Will new BOD personalities mesh with existing BOD per-
sonalities?
• Are there any hidden-agenda motivations at play? Any
potential or perceived conflicts of interest? Are board
candidates incentivized only by BOD fees or are they
geared to tackling challenging strategic issues and mak-
ing problem-solving contributions to the company’s
“team?”
BOD members are experiencing more and more con-
straints.As the old joke goes,“What’s the difference between a
BOD member and a shopping cart? The shopping cart has
more flexibility, and the director holds more food!”
What Does the “Selling Brochure” Look Like?
If the company is truly serious about an IPO, then it should
already have a thoughtful, comprehensive business plan. My
experience suggests that a short, simple, and alluring one-
page summary of the company is necessary to open the door
to investment banks.Assume that with busy investor bankers,
you have 30 seconds to create interest. Discuss succinctly
and brilliantly:
• Why the company is the “best of the best” in its “space.”
• How the company’s products and service beat out the
competition.
• Who their blue chip customers are.
• What industry trends tend to reinforce the company’s
rosy market projections.
• What the use of proceeds will be, and how additional IPO
resources will make a difference.
• What is the company’s key intellectual property and how
is it protected.
• Who is key management.
• What critical strategic alliances are in place.
• What are other innovative approaches and strategies that
make the company interesting to potential public
investors.
For meetings with IBs, back up this one-pager with an 8- to
10-slide PowerPoint pitch, with handouts, product literature,
photos, and the like.All this preparation will be the basis for
the subsequent road show.
If You Actually Get to Meet and Talk to an
Investment Banker, How Do You Evaluate
the Possible Relationship?
The poster boy for successful IPOs in the late 1990s was
CSFB’s Frank Quattrone. As the banker who honchoed the
Amazon IPO, he allegedly drove his annual remuneration up
over $100 million. In time, Quattrone got bitten by his own 
e-mails which purportedly showed that he was a “spinner” of
IPO shares; that is, he used the much-sought-after IPO share
allocation as a preferential benefit for targeted clients.
Quattrone was the king of power and ego in investment bank-
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ing.His criminal prosecution was based on his alleged lying to
federal authorities.
In this context, the mantra “Greed is good” is, therefore, not
inappropriate for the IPO Quest. Understand well that invest-
ment bankers will view the company with a primary objective
in mind: How to earn very large amounts of money from fees,
stock options,and trading associated with any IPO relationship
that may arise. With this sensitivity to the underlying greed
impacting the whole IPO process, there are many investment
banking evaluation factors issues to assess:
• What role will this particular investment bank play in the
offering—lead manager,comanager-middle (of front cover
of prospectus), comanager-right—dependent on the eco-
nomics of the IPO?
• What IPOs has the firm been involved in during the last
three years, with what success?
• What is their institutional sales capability?
• What kind of retail brokerage operations do they have?
• What will the research coverage be on the company? Is
the company’s industry one that the firm already covers?
Is the research group respected?
• What kind of investor meetings will the firm sponsor?
• What law firm will the underwriter use as counsel?
• How does the road show schedule map out? How many
meetings in how many cities? To what audiences?
(Institutional, retail, private clientele, etc.)
• Will there be a European component to the offering?
• What will the underwriting syndication look like? With
what kind of share distribution?
• What is their stance on selling shareholders as part of the
offering?
• How about “set-aside”IPO shares for company friends and
family?
• What is the expectation for the (Greenshoe) overallot-
ment option to be exercised? This can enhance the size of
the offering.
• What will the schedule and location of the Registration
Statement drafting session be?
• What kind of guidelines does the banker suggest regard-
ing valuation and IPO size?
• Who in the underwriter’s organization makes the final
IPO decision regarding the company, when, and with
what documentation?
Assuming that the Company and Its
Advisors Have Agreed to Proceed with a
Given Investment Bank, What’s Left before
Scooping up All the IPO Cash?
Actually, the real work has only just begun. First the company
must support the underwriter in a road show to develop
investor interest in the offering. To prepare for the series of
multicity presentations, there are a few guidelines for a candi-
date company:
• Think through what company attributes that a prospec-
tive investor might find particularly attractive. Integrate
two to three key selling points throughout the presenta-
tion.Repeat,repeat,repeat.You want the audience to walk
away with the message etched in memory.
• Anticipate the five “worst” possible questions the audi-
ence might ask and thoroughly brainstorm the best way
to craft responses. Be prepared to provide good facts; no
BS!
• Suggest what important post-IPO events and milestones
can be anticipated that might translate into high-profile
press releases to the financial community and to the gen-
eral public.
• Deal to the presentation strengths of the management
team. If the founding technologist is shy and retiring,min-
imize his or her involvement. Conversely, if the marketing
person treats an opportunity to perform in front of a
crowd like “open mike night” at the local comedy club,
think it through thoroughly and orchestrate accordingly.
• Prepare and rehearse the presentation several times. Get
in “the zone.” Test thoroughly all audiovisual support
equipment well in advance and make sure that there are
plenty of spare bulbs, fuses, batteries, and the like. Don’t
assume that technical support will be available on-site.On
an IPO road show in Europe, I once had to buy two com-
puters in London (they did not lease or rent them at that
time).As a result,American Express thought that someone
had stolen my credit card! Also, in the United Kingdom,
the PAL video format (lines per inch) is not compatible
with the U.S. format. Plan accordingly.
• Remember the words of Mark Twain: “It usually takes
more than three weeks to prepare a good impromptu
speech.”
Meanwhile, the company also joins with the underwriter
and their respective legal counsels to prepare the 100 or so
pages of the Registration Statement.There are both lyrics (text)
and music (financial data) involved. In short, an enormous
workload remains to score this piece.The drafting team must:
• Prepare and present audited financials.
• Describe the underwriting arrangements and the scope of
the offering.
• Discuss the risk factors.
• Analyze the use of proceeds.
• Calculate the dilution to public shareholders.
• Discuss selling security holders.
• Describe the company’s business.
• Present “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition.”This section is particularly important
since the SEC is really forcing management to take respon-
sibility for intelligently and honestly representing signifi-
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cant issues such as revenues, costs, expenses,profitability,
working capital, cash flow, investments, and other trends
important to the investor.
• Discuss the company’s management and BOD.
• Disclose material contracts and related party transactions.
• Provide legal and accounting opinion letters.
• Provide exhibits of backup information deemed impor-
tant by underwriter’s counsel.
Miraculously, the draft Registration Statement eventually
does gets completed. But not without some drama.With end-
less requests by underwriter’s counsel for more and more dis-
closures, in combination with often impossible time pressures,
changing market conditions, and the press of ongoing compa-
ny business—tempers have been known to flare. I have initiat-
ed, broken up, and mediated a number of spats. Thankfully,
there has been no loss of life.
The Initial Registration Statement is then filed, and the ini-
tial regulatory review begins.The SEC and the states have con-
current jurisdiction over the offering of securities. The
Registration Statement must be filed with the SEC, with those
states in which the shares may be offered, and with the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). The SEC’s
review assesses compliance with its requirements, including
the adequacy of the company’s disclosures.The SEC does not
address the merits of the offering. Some states may consider
the merits of the offering under their “blue sky”laws.The NASD
reviews the filing to determine if the underwriters’ compensa-
tion is excessive.
So Can Anything Go Wrong Now?
But of course. Dozens of IPO action items may be outstanding
on any given day, dependent upon the several organizations
and scores of people involved. Overlay this frenzy of activity
with imperfect information, rigorous deadlines, and human
frailties and you have a recipe for deal-threatening problems.
The short list of my not-ready-for-IPO-time experiences
(among several deals) includes:
• Underwriters’ counsel heaping profanities on the SEC
examiner in a teleconference, requiring my intervention
as a diplomat—not a particular strength of mine.
• Sickness in the SEC office causing delays in the SEC
review process and resulting in “the numbers going
stale”—a condition requiring the auditors’ review of
another quarter of financial results.
• The CEO firing the VP-Marketing, requiring an organiza-
tional scramble.
• The COO suffering a career-ending stroke during the reg-
istration period.
• Two IPOs lost in the 1999–2000 Wall Street “bubble burst.”
• For an acquisition targeted with the use of proceeds,addi-
tional due diligence showing such an acquisition to be a
bad decision.
• For another acquisition targeted with the use of proceeds,
the acquisition company’s CEO dropping dead 45 min-
utes before closing.
• One of the three principal underwriters in the syndicate
being suspended by the SEC.
Regardless of such setbacks, the secret to IPO success is
endurance. Retrospectively, it’s easy to be romantic about this
IPO journey. Frankly, for each IPO that I have experienced, the
Registration Statement trek at times has been unadulterated
torture. I’m sure I would have remembered if I had had any
fun! Like a marathon runner, you must stubbornly persevere.
Once the company has reached the SEC review stage, there is
hope.The finish line is almost in sight. Some 20–60 days after
the initial filing the SEC issues a comment letter indicating
those areas in which it believes the filing does not comply.The
IPO team subsequently translates these comments into an
amended Registration Statement,which is filed.After a series of
one or more iterations, all parties become satisfied with the
technical and disclosure aspects of the Registration. Next the
pricing amendment is filed.The pricing amendment discloses
the offering price, the underwriters’ commission, and the net
proceeds to the company.
Although there is technically a 30-day waiting period for the
SEC to review the final Registration Statement, the company
can request “acceleration” for the deal to become effective, to
which the SEC typically accedes.The final prospectus is print-
ed and distributed to interested investors.The closing occurs 3
to 4 days after “going effective,” with the company issuing the
securities to the underwriters and receiving the proceeds (net
of the underwriters’ compensation) from the offering.
By this time,everyone directly involved with the IPO should
be thoroughly numb.The company’s cash position, thankfully,
will be much improved.And the organization should now be
poised to be growth-oriented and exciting.
The Honeymoon Period
Is a Little Post-IPO Euphoria Such a Bad
Thing?
Euphoria is one trait that distinguishes homo sapiens from,say,
daffodils.It’s a good human emotion.Exhausted and cranky,the
company’s management team—with the successful comple-
tion of its IPO marathon—may rightfully achieve an endorphin
high.This is alright for a few days,as long as it’s not a sustained
high!
The CEO driving a fancy new car is to be expected. In con-
trast, the CEO taking a three-month vacation to Australia
(which happened in one IPO I backed)—just months before
the BOD fired him—is not expected and is, of course, unac-
ceptable. Monthly management pep talks to the troops—with
passing references to the company’s stock performance—are
generally OK. Daily posting of the share price in the employ-
86 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
12
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Vol. 8 [2005], No. 1, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol8/iss1/10
ees’ cafeteria is generally ill-advised. Individual obsession with
(paper) net worth from the company’s stock performance can
only drain the energy from the organization.
Stock-watching can become a distraction, if not a disease.To
cite Andrew Carnegie (Forbes 1974):“Nothing tells in the long
run like good judgment, and no sound judgment can remain
with the man whose mind is disturbed by the mercurial
changes of the stock exchange. It places him under an influ-
ence akin to intoxication. What is not, he sees, and what he
sees, is not.”
Intoxication caused by IPO success is tolerable for very
short periods. Business life marches on; the company’s Road
Show “story” needs to be implemented.There is considerable
work to accomplish.
What’s the Most Important Task in the
IPO Honeymoon Period?
The key post-IPO task may undoubtedly be counterintuitive to
many.Despite now having perhaps tens of millions of cash and
cash equivalents in the treasury, the company should have as
its single most important objective the discipline to conserve
cash. An approach that I have developed in response to the
newly public company’s evaporating cash balances is to break
out into concrete subtasks the major areas of expenditure in
the Use of Proceeds,as disclosed in the Registration Statement.
Each task—be it infrastructure for a larger capacity facility or
development projects for enhanced technology or extensive
marketing programs—can be budgeted and the cash secured
in a virtual escrow account.
Why display such cash paranoia? Many a company emerging
from the IPO experience is still populated by senior executives
who are also company founders or early employees. Surviving
for years on sweat and guile and occasionally smoke and mir-
rors, these pioneers may now be looking for tangible affirma-
tion of their accomplishments, not gained from their “paper”
net worth.Spending some “mad money”can be a psychological
outlet. Perhaps an explanation resides in a sampling of some
unfortunate IPO honeymoon experiences I’ve observed.
• A CEO/head researcher who wanted to perform strategi-
cally diversionary and expensive ($500,000) R&D
improvements upon some lab equipment that was com-
mercially available off-the-shelf ($30,000).
• A CEO who committed to oversized and expensive ($3.5
million over six years) new corporate office space before
passing it by the BOD for approval.
• A CEO who requested a new hire wish list from the
troops. He found out that if everyone was granted what
he or she wanted from Santa, that the company’s head-
count would have increased by three and a half times and
labor costs that would have fattened annual payroll by
$12 million.
Over the years I’ve learned that corporate headquar-
ters—dependent, of course, upon the company structure—
can be managed efficiently with a bare bones staff—say a
CEO, a small financial and administrative department and
perhaps a corporate development guru. In my view, over-
head begets more overhead. The company should nip its
costly growth in the bud. Further, the operating business
units can avoid or minimize Kudzu-like cost build-up with
initiatives such as outsourcing. As reported by Thomas
(2003), outsourcing has now reached the point that the
company can substitute people in Manila for high-priced
New York City staff to answer the customer service phone.
Computer code can be written in Bangalore as competent-
ly as in Sunnyvale, California.Aetna, for example, has much
of its data entry for medical claims performed by 1,400
workers in Ghana linked to the United States by a satellite
Internet connection.All of this outsourcing activity can save
the company plenty of cash.
How Must the Company be Managed
Differently as a Public Entity?
The euphoria and the infusion of cash associated with a suc-
cessful IPO come with strings attached. In transitioning from
private to public company, management discovers that it has
gained two new bosses—the public shareholders and the reg-
ulatory agencies. How should management respond? In theo-
ry, the answer is elegantly simple. The following guidelines
need to be followed:
1. Meet or exceed revenue and earnings projections.
2. Report to the SEC quarterly (10K) and annually (10K) on
a timely basis.
3. Disclose all material events (8K), including major con-
tracts, business relationships, changes in officers and
directors, changes in assets, and changes in control.
4. Communicate well with “the Street” in order for the com-
pany to become better known to the financial communi-
ty and to the public.
The BOD spurs company management to fulfill its perform-
ance objectives (guideline 1).The company’s lawyers (guide-
line 2) and auditors (guideline 3) assist the company in its SEC
reporting.The task that the company is less prepared to han-
dle is establishing a working communication with Wall Street
and the public shareholders (guideline 4).
Why and How Is the Wall Street
Relationship so Important?
Now publicly traded, the company has millions of shares of its
stock in the hands of the public.Thousands of shares may be
traded every hour.Some share holdings may be in large institu-
tional accounts; others are held in small, individual accounts.
The share price—according to Economics 101—is determined
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by the marketplace’s supply-and-demand impact on the com-
pany’s shares. If interest in the company heats up, the share
price is likely to follow suit. Interest in the company is a func-
tion of knowledge and information about the company. How
many people know about the business performance and
prospects of the company? Are existing IPO shareholders
retaining their stakes or selling off? What issues are being dis-
cussed in the business press about the company? Is the com-
pany’s public profile positive and on the rise? Even a casual
reflection on these issues will suggest how important it is for
the company to nurture informed Wall Street contacts.
How Does the Company Best Manage the
Public Outreach and Information
Dissemination Process?
Like most business endeavors,an investor relations program to
capture the public limelight faces stiff competition.The NASD
and the NASDAQ electronic stock market represent a beehive
of frenetic activity. Consider the statistics (in part, from the
NASD and NASDAQ websites):
• NASD has approximately 5,200 member firms.
• Member firms represent approximately 97,000 branch
offices and 660,000 registered reps.
• NASDAQ lists approximately 3,300 companies.
• Registered stock analysts total on the order of 3,200.
• The company’s shareholder list can range from two thou-
sand to tens of thousands.
To disseminate the company’s “story”to this highly populat-
ed and complex network,a competent,charismatic, intelligent,
and well-connected senior member of the management team
should be sent off to wage the Investor Relations Crusade.
Regrettably, an individual with this complete skill set rarely
exists.Accordingly, team effort is often required,often with the
use of an outside investor relations firm.
Every investor relations campaign, of course, is subject to
the guidance and dictates of the company’s investment bank-
ing sponsors,and must be crafted somewhat in response to the
share price trends.
What Is the Company’s Message to the
Street?
The Street has little time for preliminaries. The concerns of
fund managers,account executives and analysts are straightfor-
ward:
• Who is the company?
• Why is its story special?
• What are earnings expectations? 
• What is the associated risk?
• What confidence is there in the company’s management?
• What is the distribution of stock ownership ?
• What is the company’s value?
The company must anticipate questions related to these
concerns, recognizing that each contact in the financial com-
munity has a particular agenda. Some are interested in invest-
ing in “a new story”; others are only willing to start a monitor-
ing file on the company .The company would be well advised
to start meeting with the lower profile analysts and fund man-
agers, listen to their feedback, fine-tune the company’s mes-
sage, and work the communications campaign up the Wall
Street food chain.
If the entrepreneur is involved in the communications pro-
gram with Wall Street, he or she must quell the natural entre-
preneurial tendency to paint an overly optimistic picture of
the company.Promise only those results that can be delivered.
The pressures to perform are difficult enough without self-
inflicted damage. In this regard, Sommer (2000) has devised
“Ten Commandments”when dealing with the Street:
1. Remember to keep holy thy earnings announcement
day.
2. Thou shall not covet thy neighbor’s stock options.
3. Honor thy independent accountant and thy SEC.
4. Thou shalt not take the rules of GAAP in vain.
5. I am the SEC.Thou shalt not manipulate financial
results before me.
6. Thou shall not commit accounting adultery.
7. Thou shalt not steal revenue from the next quarter.
8. Thou shalt not bear false numbers to the Street.
9. Thou shalt not send thy customers goods to ware-
houses.
10. Thou shalt not use side letters.
If the Street thinks that the company has violated any of
these Ten Commandments and has “sinned,” the company will
be shunned. One false step can be cataclysmic to the compa-
ny’s reputation and take an enormous effort to repair.
All too often, I’ve observed a crest-fallen CEO of a newly
public company who has experienced the market sentiment
turn against the company.The “instant fame”of an IPO is a curi-
ous phenomenon.At first, it’s like the cute little puppy that you
warm up to. But as it gets older, it’s becomes like a rabid crea-
ture that turns on you and eventually eats you up.
Interference from Pesky Third Parties
What Factors Impact the Company’s
Relationship with Its Public Shareholders?
Not unlike having a busy-body mother-in-law (or father-in-law,
to be fair) interfering with the newlyweds, the public compa-
ny must start anticipating when the next (regulatory) hurdle
might appear, thus confirming that the honeymoon period is
finally over.Going into the IPO process,company management
certainly would be aware of the basic reporting requirements
of quarterly (10Q) and annual (10K) filings with the SEC. Not
so well known perhaps would be the breadth of the compa-
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ny’s “in-law” population. Regulatory hurdles abound. In addi-
tion to the SEC, there are the NASD, the NASDAQ electronic
stock market, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
and, of course, the accounting industry.
The highly publicized Enron scandal brought down the
firm of Arthur Andersen,reducing the Big-Five audit industry to
a Big-Four.The U.S. Congress became involved and passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to tighten the screws on corporate scruti-
ny.The legislation passed in the Senate by a 97–0 vote, suggest-
ing that the pendulum had really swung radically in the direc-
tion of intensified corporate governance, or that no one in the
Senate had actually read the bill or that not enough debate
occurred to create healthy dissent, or all of the above.
The net effect of Sarbox—ironically—has been to reinvigo-
rate the scandal-weakened accounting profession. Reviled in
2002 as enablers of corporate con artists, the audit firms have
made a near-miraculous come-back. The Big-Four of KPMG,
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWHC), Ernst & Young (E&Y) and
Deloitte & Touche had record revenues and profits for 2004
(Jenkins 2005) and hiring has gone “through the roof.” As
reported by The Economist (2004), the Big-Four audit 97 per-
cent of all U.S. companies with sales over $250 million.These
are enormous firms:




E & Y 13.1 102,969
KPMG 12.2 98,900
Certainly there are arguments for such an oligopoly; it pro-
vides the scale necessary to assess broad operations of the
multinationals.These firms worry about litigation arising from
scandal.And the scandals continue. During 2004, we observed
various forms of financial manipulation unearthed at Fannie
Mae, at Nortel, and at Italy’s Parmalat. Accordingly, the audit
industry devotes huge resources (10–20% of revenues) to
shield themselves from litigation risks. In the end, of course,
clients pay the tab.
Big Company Scandals Aside, Don’t IPO
Companies Enter the Public Playing Field
with a Clean Slate?
Not always.What this increased call for corporate governance
means for the smaller newly public company is more than a lit-
tle troubling.With the current regulatory climate at its peak of
intense oversight, and accounting firms flexing their CPA mus-
cles, many new public companies enter this battlefield unpre-
pared. As reported by Moregenson (2005), the IPO Plus
Aftermarket Fund (Greenwich Conn.) chronicles the share-
holder-friendly practices of IPO companies and finds them
lacking.Looking at the use of proceeds,management and BOD
compensation, and BOD independence—IPO Plus finds that
51 percent of the companies that went public in 2004 had
poor to very poor governance practices. This is even lower
than the 37 percent negative governance figure for 1999 when
the stock market went crazy.
Newly public companies must learn the ropes in dealing
with all these pesky regulators, install all the needed internal
control systems, and make all appropriate public disclosures.
What Needs to be Disclosed?
Companies are required to file an 8-K with the SEC document-
ing “material” events.The dilemma, of course, is defining what
“material”means.As reported by Katz (2004), the SEC has stat-
ed in a 1999 staff accounting bulletin that an event is material
“if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person
would consider it important.” Most entrepreneurs and CEOs I
know are not terribly edified by such mushy guidance! The
SEC also reduced the 5 percent of net income rule-of-thumb as
to how big an impact there must be before the need to file an
8-K. I had found the 5 percent guideline to be useful. Now the
path to determining disclosure is even more fuzzy. Editorial
bias aside, here’s what Section 409 of Sarbanes-Oxley says has
to be put in an 8-K filing:
• An unexpected entry into a material definitive agreement;
• An unexpected exit from a material definitive agreement;
• Creation of a material direct financial obligation, including
long-term and short-term debt and capital-lease commit-
ments, or off-balance-sheet arrangements;
• The acceleration or increase of a material direct financial
obligation or an obligation under an off-balance-sheet
arrangement;
• Material costs incurred during the exit from a business or
the disposal of an asset;
• Impairment of assets;
• Notice of a delisting or failure to satisfy a continued delist-
ing rule or standard, transfer of listing,or completed inter-
im review; and
• A decision that the company’s previously issued financial
statements or audit reports can no longer be relied on.
On August 23, 2004, the SEC issued new regulations requir-
ing companies to file 8-Ks within just four business days.The
above guidelines might include anything from a big customer
win to a significant layoff to a new executive compensation. In
all cases, management must make determinations of materiali-
ty, and how to disclose and communicate such events “on the
fly.”As a Wall Street friend suggests,“When in doubt, 8-K it!”
What Other Regulatory Responses Need
to be Considered?
There’s a shopping list of possible regulatory issues for compa-
ny management and its BOD to consider.To cite just one exam-
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ple, consider Syre’s report (2004) of Massachusetts-based
Brooks Automation, Inc. In December 2004, the company dis-
closed that it was accelerating the vesting of 1.3 million
“below water” options. That it would make worthless options
exercisable immediately reflects the anticipation of changing
accounting rules in June 2005. Even though options may have
no market value,they still may have accounting value and need
to be expensed. Not acting preemptively to the rule change
deadline would present the company with the worst of both
worlds: the expensing of options to depress earnings while
being unable to provide financial incentives to company
employees since the options would be the equivalent of
worthless Confederate dollars.
As Neble reports (2002), M&A activity has been impacted
negatively by the elimination of the pooling-of-interests
method of accounting for acquisitions.FASB rule changes now
require the use of the purchase method of accounting. In
short, various categories of intangibles must be separated-out
from goodwill,valued,and amortized over their respective use-
ful lives. Valuation experts must be used, and various asset
impairment tests must be applied.
Another area of concern is addressing and eliminating
“dummy corporations” or special purpose entities (SPEs)
under recently released FASB Interpretation No.46 (FIN 46).As
reported by Reason (2004), these dummy corporations have
typically been used to own assets the company doesn’t want
on its own books, for any number of reasons. In the post-Enron
environment, investors frowned at the appearance of impro-
priety and precipitated the issuance of FIN 46.
Certainly more important is Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley.
As reported by Nyberg (2004), now company management
must not only disclose financial control weaknesses, but pro-
vide monitoring and documentation of its financial control sys-
tems with annual testing by the company.Then—you guessed
it—the company must “coordinate” with its auditors to deter-
mine what deficiencies are material and require disclosure.
When management and the auditors disagree, guess who
wins? And if the company’s financial systems are found lack-
ing,how can investors trust the company’s public information?
Consider NYSE-traded Adecco SA which could not convince
Ernst & Young to sign off on its financials because of weak
internal controls.The announcement whacked the share price
35 percent. Six months and $121 million of fixes later, the
share price was still down 20 percent%. A Wall Street wag
offered that “Sarbox has done for public companies what the
Titanic did for the cruise business.”
What Other Regulatory Issues Have Wall
Street Implications?
Other than constantly having to answer analyst questions like
“How’s the company doing on implementing Sarbox-404?”and
“How much will it cost the company for compliance?,” the
other important regulation of recent note (October 2000) is
Regulation FD (Financial Disclosure).As reported by Rudman
(2001), the regulation requires the company to disclose to all
shareholders material information that the company shares
with securities market professionals and fund managers. In the
game of cat-and-mouse between corporate officer (mouse)
and analyst (cat), Regulation FD constrains the mouse but not
the cat. In their sublimely clever ways, analysts can often
extract information before the company representative knows
what has happened. But the company has to work with the
analysts to receive much-sought-after research coverage.
The key point to remember about this overwhelming set of
rules and regulations is that the regulation has been in
response to various sins of commission and sins of omission
on Wall Street. Perhaps humorist Dave Barry (2002) provides
insight:
Q: Why didn’t Wall Street realize that Enron was a fraud?
A: Because Wall Street relies on stock analysts. These are
people who do research on companies and then,no matter
what they find, even if the company has burned to the
ground, enthusiastically recommend that investors buy the
stock.
Keeping It All Together
How Does the Company Cope with All These
Divergent, Powerful Forces Impacting It?
In a way, the Board of Directors serves as a company marriage
counselor, refereeing the disputes between the company and
the shareholders and the pesky and often interfering third par-
ties (regulators). The major BOD oversight concerns for the
new IPO company are serious:
• How to fulfill the Street’s earning estimates for the com-
pany;
• How to assess the company’s management team to deter-
mine if it is holding up under public scrutiny;
• How to stay listed on NASDAQ (or other exchanges); and
• How to raise additional capital, as required.
How Should the Company’s Management
Handle Earnings Estimates with Wall
Street?
The concept is simple: Do the numbers right and communi-
cate with everyone.The challenge,as always, is acceptable exe-
cution.
It is no deep secret that public companies appear to “man-
age earnings.” A study by Thomson Financial (Moregenson
2004) examined how many Dow 30 industrials met (or beat by
a penny) consensus estimates during each quarter over a five-
year period. On average, almost half (46%) accomplished this
feat.When one considers all the variables that go into project-
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ing earnings,such bull’s-eye accuracy of “beating the analysts’
estimates by a penny” is beyond chance. General Electric in
the 1990s, for example, made the front page of the Wall Street
Journal (Loomis 1999) chronicling the many ways CEO Jack
Welch smoothed GE’s earnings. GE’s tricks of the trade includ-
ed the careful timing of capital gains and creative use of
reserves and restructuring charges. Henry reports (2001) a
number of ploys and potential abuses that companies use.
• The Big Bath. Takes a large write-off, booking costs now
to boost earnings and margins in the future.
• Vendor Financing. Lends money to cash-strapped cus-
tomers so that they can purchase the company’s prod-
ucts, boosting sales and profits.
• Pension Gambit. Determines that the company pension
plan is overfunded and reduces company contributions,
hiding the gain in the financial footnotes.
• Before Its Time. Treats pending sales as if they’re already
on the books and logs in sales without netting out agreed-
to rebates.
• Backdoor Bargains. Motivates a big customer to place
orders by buying its stock or granting it cheap warrants.
My strong prejudice is to avoid such ploys.The downside
risk of regulatory intervention generally outweighs any short-
term upside benefits.The London investment community has
a wonderful way of warning against aggressive management
behavior:“Don’t try to be too clever by half!”
Sometimes the company does many things well and still
loses. Swartz (2005) reports, for example, that eBay’s 2004 Q4
earnings rose 44 percent, but still disappointed Wall Street,
sending the share price down 12 percent overnight. eBay’s
CFO correctly commented,“My concern is managing the com-
pany’s performance, not its stock price”
Regulation FD provides the company with some protection
in dealing with the Street. As suggested by Graham (2001),
there are certain approaches companies employ to keep
investors and analysts informed under Regulation FD that
should actually rein in the company and prevent it from being
“too clever by half:”
• Designate a small number of management representatives
to discuss company developments with the public.
• Determine in advance how to react rapidly if someone
discloses information inappropriately. Have available a
SWAT response team, including company legal counsel, to
put out the fire.
• Don’t respond to rumors, unless requested to do so by a
stock exchange.
• Employ webcasts to make earnings conference calls and
company presentations available to the public.
• Eliminate selective communication to analysts, making
forecasts available to all in press releases.
• Disclose key business trends more often than quarterly.
Provide updates at regularly scheduled intervals.
How Should the Company’s BOD Evaluate
Management’s Performance?
Carefully and often.The half-life of an entrepreneur-CEO in a
newly public company is embarrassingly short. Anecdotally I
offer several explanations.The entrepreneur-CEO:
• is often untrained for a “big company”environment;
• wants to focus on the business of the company, not the
business of Wall Street;
• reacts defensively when experts criticize the company;
• reacts dismissively when other members of management
are assigned to investor relations;
• begins to fret when the litany of new constraints (e.g.,
Regulation FD, Sarbox–404) seems to handcuff manage-
ment; and
• stops having fun running the company.
What should a BOD do if management performance falls
short? The set answer, of course, is to take appropriate correc-
tive action. Easier said than done. Even independent directors
have hearts. I’ve been involved on several occasions in replac-
ing the entrepreneur-CEO.While personal ties on the BOD can
be strong, responsibilities to shareholders take precedent. It is
never any fun, however, to be known as the “Dr. Kervorkian of
the board room!”
Does the Street appreciate dramatic BOD actions? Often the
departure of a CEO has a positive impact on the company’s
share price. Kranz (2005) reports that in addition to the 7 per-
cent one-day up-tick that Hewlett-Packard enjoyed from the
ouster of CEO Carly Fiorina in 2005 (Q1), over the years other




• J. C. Penney—16.0%
• 3M—11.1%
CEO turnover-of-the-uglier-kind involves scandal. Many
know of Bernie Ebbers at WorldCom Inc.,Dennis Kozlowski of
Tyco International Ltd.,Richard Scrushy of HealthSouth Corp.,
and Ken Lay of Enron Corp.—all involved in marquee prosecu-
tions for various forms of fraud and conspiracy.Not the kind of
business legacy that the aspiring entrepreneur had in mind in
pursuing an IPO. In growing a public company, smarts and
hard work are important.The CEO must also have a moral com-
pass.
What kind of trouble can the new public
company encounter regarding continued
listing on the NASDAQ stock market?
Certainly no company proceeds with an IPO with the thought
of someday becoming delisted. If the company hits some
speed bumps in the road to success, however, earnings fore-
casts can be missed, cash flow can continue negative, and the
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public market can turn its back on the company.The following
are the listing requirements for the NASDAQ National Market:
• $1 Share Price. If a company’s shares trade for less than
$1 for 30 consecutive days, the company has 90 days to
bring up the share price.
• Public Float.At least 750,000 shares of the company must
be available for public trading.
• Public Float Value. The total value of the publicly traded
shares must be at least $5 million.
• Net Tangible Assets. The company’s fixed assets and
accounts receivable must be worth at least $4 million.
• Number of Shareholders.At least 400 people must hold a
minimum of 100 shares of company stock.
• Market Makers. There must be at least two market mak-
ers willing to buy and sell company shares.
• Timely Public Filings. Companies must make all filings.
Each trading day, NASDAQ publishes on its website a list of
companies that are noncompliant with its continued listing
standards.An analysis of a recent day (February 7, 2005), pro-
vides the following profile of 102 companies cited with com-
pliance deficiencies:
• Bid price—38 companies
• Delinquent filings—21 companies
• Audit committee composition—20 companies
• BOD independence—12 companies
• Net tangible assets—5 companies
• Other deficiencies—12 companies
Can the Company Solve Some of Its Listing
Problems by Raising More Capital?
Perhaps.Obviously BOD composition issues and timely SEC fil-
ings can be addressed without more capital. Certainly more
paid-in capital helps to improve the net tangible assets stan-
dard. If a secondary public offering is managed correctly, it is
possible to improve the company’s bid price. If the bid price is
a problem to begin with, it’s undoubtedly a particularly bad
time to contemplate a secondary public offering.
When the public capital markets are not considered viable,
the company may consider turning to the private markets and
a hybrid security called a PIPE (for Private Investment in Public
Entities). Once viewed as purely bail-out funding, the PIPE
instrument has attained increasing respectability as more com-
panies do PIPE deals. Fink (2004) reports that approximately
800 to 1,200 PIPE deals per year have been transacted since
2000.How PIPEs are structured can be illustrated by Evergreen
Solar (Marlboro Mass.). In May 2003, Evergreen raised $29.5
million in the form of preferred stock convertible into com-
mon shares at a 25 percent discount from the public market
price and warrants giving the investor the right to sell the
stock at a 125 percent premium over the PIPE offering price
after SEC registration.The key to this deal was a fixed conver-
sion rate (no “downward death spirals”) and an investor base
that was not inclined to short-sell the stock. Evergreen saw its
stock climb more than 120 percent (through the end of 2004)
since the PIPE.
Despite Evergreen’s story, and even with protection against
death spirals (variable conversion rates with no floor price),
companies may discover that the use of PIPEs put downward
pressure on the stock price because of the discount and dilu-
tion.The irony is that small capitalization companies generally
need the infusion of new capital the most,but investors like to
enter into PIPE transactions with larger companies.
How Does One Assess If "Being Public" Is
Working for the Company?
Not unlike a marriage, money problems and stressed relation-
ships are sure indications of problems. How well does the
company relate to the distractions of third-party regulators and
investors? With increased pressures from auditors and their
increasing empowerment from Sarbanes-Oxley, it is appropri-
ate to question whether access to public capital is worth the
cost of maintaining a public company. Consider the average





• Director & Officers’ insurance—$250K
• SEC filings and annual meeting—$50 K
• Miscellaneous public expenses—$75K
Might the company have a better use for $ 1 million?
Perhaps.The option to go private is tortuous, often requiring
a large reverse stock split to induce the small shareholders
to sell-off. Once the number of shareholders of record is
below 300, the company can qualify for delisting.The very
contemplation of such a move can cause downward pres-
sure on the share price and market value.The process is dif-
ficult but doable. It’s like getting the toothpaste back into
the tube.
In summary, just as a marriage can result in divorce,an IPO can
lead to delisting or a company deciding to “go private.”That
there is a downside scenario doesn’t mean you don’t take the
big IPO leap. Entrepreneurs understand risk. Every case is
unique. Like many marriages, many IPOs are unqualified suc-
cesses.A typical IPO results in a capital raise-up ($25–$200 mil-
lion) far in excess of what be available to a private company;
and at valuations ($50–$1,500 million) many times larger than
otherwise possible.This is the IPO carrot!
Should a company pursue an IPO? The situation is much
akin to how one advises a friend contemplating marriage:
“How exciting! But have you really thought it over?”
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